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The author outlines a new legal approach, which he labels federal constitutionalism, to the 
question of aboriginal difference in Canada. This approach has the potential to open up more 
fruitful avenues for the resolution of aboriginal law issues than either the “frozen rights” 
approach currently adopted by the Supreme Court of Canada or the treaty federalism 
approach, which posits that treaties should be used to resolve all differences between aboriginals 
and non-aboriginals. The author outlines the difficulties inherent in both the frozen rights and 
treaty federalism approaches. Federal constitutionalism, in contrast, draws its vitality from an 
organic understanding of Canada’s constitutional experience. It would allow aboriginal 
peoples to be seen as federal actors who have historically shaped the Canadian federation. 
Federal constitutionalism is a multi-faceted approach that would permit aboriginal questions 
to be addressed using the federal principle, thereby allowing the legal focus to move away from 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. Aboriginal peoples would be able to exercise the 
rights of sovereignty over their own internal affairs, while individual aboriginals could 
participate directly in federal and provincial governments without having to proceed through 
the intermediary of aboriginal representatives. Federal constitutionalism would allow 
aboriginal peoples a guaranteed sphere of autonomy, while permitting recognition of their 
historical interdependence with non-aboriginal peoples. 
 
What follows is a very brief and limited outline of a much broader 
project — one that seeks to identify the proper legal lens through which 
“aboriginal difference” can be apprehended in the Canadian context. Given 
the brevity of this paper, what follows might seem somewhat abbreviated 
at times and lacking in the nuances that a lengthier essay would permit.1  
In our contemporary world, law operates as a mechanism of social 
recognition in that it marks off some practices as being socially 
                                               
* Professeur titulaire, Faculté de droit, Université de Montréal. I gratefully acknowledge 
the editorial help of Marianne Breese. I also wish to thank François Chevrette for his 
valuable comments. 
1.  This paper is drawn from a much longer manuscript that will be submitted for later 
publication. My argument in this paper is sketchy in places and leaves many fundamental 
questions unanswered. My objective here is to bring my theory out of the closet. 
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legitimate and worthy of the investment of collective resources.2 A 
juridical concept chosen to translate a particular social reality has 
enormous consequences because it will imprison that reality within its 
broad — or narrow — conceptual confines. It will therefore 
predetermine, to a certain extent, the manner in which the particular 
social reality can be legally and politically understood. 
Since 1982, many people, from Supreme Court justices to legal 
scholars, be they aboriginal or non-aboriginal, have battled one another 
over the meaning that should be ascribed to the words “aboriginal 
rights” found in section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. This provision 
established, for the first time in Canadian legal history, that “[t]he 
existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada 
are hereby recognized and affirmed.” 
To encapsulate the last 24 years of interpretation of section 35, one could 
say that the constitutionalization of aboriginal rights has led to an 
unfortunate and unsatisfactory reification of aboriginal identity by all 
concerned, natives and non-natives alike. 
On the one hand, the Supreme Court of Canada’s understanding of 
“aboriginal rights” not only fails to acknowledge the political autonomy 
exercised by aboriginal nations before, and even after, the advent of the 
Canadian state; it also confines those rights to the culturally significant 
practices that existed during the pre-contact period. In justification of this 
approach, the Court explained in R. v. Van der Peet3 that the protection 
afforded to aboriginal rights by section 35(1) stems from the fact that 
distinctive aboriginal societies lived on the land prior to the arrival of 
Europeans. The pre-contact period has become the reference period that 
courts must consider when identifying aboriginal rights. Therefore, 
according to the Supreme Court, it is antiquity and not native political 
autonomy that forms the basis of aboriginal rights in Canada. Arguably, 
decisions such as Delgamuukw4 and Haida Nation,5 although 
                                               
2.  Pierre Noreau, “L’innovation sociale et le droit — Est-ce bien compatible?” in Le 
développement social au rythme de l’innovation (Sainte-Foy, Qc.: Presses de l’Université du 
Québec, 2004) 73. 
3.  [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507. 
4.  Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw]. 
5.  Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] 3 S.C.R. 511. 
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undoubtedly more generous, have not radically altered this piecemeal 
approach to aboriginal rights.6 
The Court’s approach to aboriginal rights, based as it is on “cultural 
distinctiveness”7 rather than on a recognition of the survival of 
aboriginal political autonomy, has been the subject of severe criticism, 
especially from anthropologists. I will not address this criticism except 
to observe that there is some truth in the anthropologists’ crude saying 
that “people [courts in this case] like their savages naked.”8 However, in 
spite of all its shortcomings, the approach adopted by the Supreme 
Court has allowed some aboriginal communities to make very 
substantial gains. 
On the other hand, some scholars would like us to believe that post-
secondary education, health care, social benefits in whatever shape or 
form, tax exemptions, and so on, can all in some mysterious way be tied 
to “pre-contact aboriginal socio-political structures.”9 If truth be told, 
from that perspective, aboriginal rights become the philosopher’s stone, 
the crucible of all imaginable hopes. For obvious strategic reasons, some 
                                               
6.  R. v. Marshall; R. v. Bernard, [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 is certainly proof of that. 
7.  Michael Asch, “The Judicial Conceptualization of Culture after Delgamuukw and Van 
der Peet” (2000) 5 Rev. Const. Stud. 119. 
8.  Glen Stohr, “The Repercussions of Orality in Federal Indian Law” (1999) 31 Ariz. St. 
L.J. 679 at 701. 
9.  Andrée Lajoie et al., “Conception malécite des droits ancestraux”, manuscript to be published 
in Mélanges en l’honneur d’Étienne Le Roy [forthcoming] [my translation and emphasis]:  
A small number of our respondents spontaneously mention certain social rights 
when they are asked what they include in aboriginal rights. They are rights to 
education, to health, but also certain privileges, including tax exemptions and the 
freedom to circulate to and from the United States, regardless of borders. To be sure, 
those rights, except the last one mentioned, may seem not to be reserved to 
aboriginals, and rather to be part of the socio-economic rights generally enjoyed by 
the citizens of countries where the welfare state (or what is left of it . . . ) prevails. But 
for our interlocutors, at least implicitly, the issue here at stake is no less than one of 
aboriginal rights, to the extent that they originate from the similar rights which are 
derived from pre-colonial socio-political structures and which would be integrated into 
Canadian law under the terms of the “treaties,” of agreements concluded between their 
ancestors and British colonials or, more plainly, as reparation for the spoliation of the 
territories of which the Malecites were victims, and which prevent them from 
obtaining these essential services by themselves. 
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aboriginal groups have argued unsuccessfully that the social and economic 
aboriginal rights they were claiming had pre-contact referents.10 
Thus, the most important flaw in the concept of “aboriginal rights” is 
that it inevitably encourages recourse to essentialist definitions of 
aboriginal identity. More specifically, the concept tends to characterize 
aboriginal peoples in either the “folk-like, feather-wearing” way 
sometimes envisaged by the Supreme Court, or in the “holistic-tradition-
based-consensual-unsoiled by western civilization” way sometimes put 
forth by aboriginals themselves.  
The problem with these substantive approaches is that there is no such 
thing as an “authentic aboriginal culture,” nor, conversely, is there such 
thing as an “inauthentic aboriginal culture.” Authenticity is no longer a 
given or monadic, indivisible and unquestionable concept. For 
aboriginals as well as non-aboriginals, identity is a contingent concept 
that cannot be reified once and for all in “constitutional concrete.” 
Differences in identity between aboriginals and non-aboriginals, and 
fundamental differences at that, certainly do exist. However, they 
should be approached in a reflexive manner, rather than an axiomatic or 
dogmatic one. 
There is no doubt that Canada’s very diverse aboriginal communities 
are distinct societies. As Richard F. McDonnell writes in a study of the 
Crees of Northern Quebec:  
 
[T]hey reproduces [sic] themselves as a population that lays claim to a particular history, 
that imagines for itself a certain future, which sees itself as harbouring particular values, as 
engaging in distinct activities, and as having a preference for certain institutional 
arrangements and biases.11 
 
However, they remain “partial societies.” In McDonnell’s words, 
“societies are partial in the sense that their membership is economically, 
politically and informationally drawn into the broader life of the State.”12  
                                               
10.  See e.g. Wasauksing First Nation v. Wasausink Lands Inc., [2004] 2 C.N.L.R. 355 
(Ont. C.A.); and National Automobile, Aerospace, Transportation and General Workers of 
Canada Local 444 v. Great Blue Heron Gaming Co., [2005] 1 C.N.L.R. 147 (OLRB). 
11.  Richard F. McDonnell, Prospects for Accountability Among the Cree of James Bay 
(Paper prepared for DINAD, November 1992) at 2 [unpublished]. 
12.  Ibid. at 29. 
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In other words, aboriginal communities are not simply aggregations of 
interchangeable abstract civic individuals. Rather, they are defined by an 
understanding of tradition, one that enables them to make sense of their 
world. One particular understanding of a tradition might be dominant 
in a community at any given point in time. However, it should not lead 
one to claim that such traditions are never contested within aboriginal 
communities, or that dissenting perspectives are heretical or 
inauthentic.13 Unfortunately, this is one of the undesirable effects of the 
substantive aboriginal rights doctrine embraced by the Supreme Court. 
Another legal concept promoted by aboriginal legal scholars is known as 
“treaty federalism.”14 It is based on the idea that all issues between 
aboriginals and non-aboriginals should be settled through treaties. As 
such, despite its name, it is premised not on a federal model but on a 
confederal one: in other words, it is a system characterized by the fragility 
of the links uniting the parts to the whole. While the nature of a 
confederation is to unite several states by treaty, a federation is a union of 
states founded on a constitution.15 Treaty federalism is also a solution that 
emphasizes the pre-1950 historical horizon of aboriginal/non-aboriginal 
relationships and fails to give any normative importance to contemporary 
relationships. It essentially ignores the deep interdependence that was 
born out of both coerced and voluntary proximity. In its extreme version, 
                                               
13.  The following statement, in a background paper prepared for the Ipperwash Inquiry, 
is an excellent example of the authentic/heretical approach:  
[T]he psychological and social effects of colonization have created divisions within 
indigenous communities between those people who have embraced a colonized 
identity and accept the legitimacy of Canadian authority and those who remain 
rooted in an authentic indigenous identity and assert the authority of their nation.  
Taiaiake Alfred & Lana Lowe, “Warrior Societies in Contemporary Indigenous 
Communities,” online: Indigenous Pathways of Action and Freedom 
<http://www.taiaiake.com/pdfs/WarriorSocietiesinIndigenousCommunities.pdf>. 
14.  The unavoidable starting points for any reflection on treaty federalism are James 
[Sakej] Youngblood Henderson & Russel Barsh, The Road: Indian Tribes And Political 
Liberty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980); and James [Sakej] Youngblood 
Henderson, “Empowering Treaty Federalism” (1994) 58 Sask. L. Rev. at 241. 
15.  Olivier Beaud, “Fédéralisme et souveraineté, notes pour une théorie constitutionnelle de 
la fédération” (1998) Rev. D.P. & S.P. 83 at 92: “[La confédération] relève du droit 
international public et [la fédération] du droit public interne; l’une voit son régime 
juridique déterminé par un traité et l’autre par une constitution.” 
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treaty federalism prohibits any direct and individual participation by 
aboriginal community members in the Canadian political and 
governmental institutions. All contacts with the Canadian state are to be 
made by the community’s representatives.  
Furthermore, treaty federalism fails to be truly federal in character because 
it focuses only on the autonomy guaranteed by federalism, leaving aside any 
consideration of the federal solidarity required to maintain the viability of the 
system. The two-row wampum of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy is often 
invoked to justify this thesis of separateness.16 The following statement by 
Ovide Mercredi and Mary Ellen Turpel provides a good example: 
 
The First Nations view our relationship today as a continuation of the treaty relationship 
of mutuality where neither side can act unilaterally without consultation. This 
partnership is symbolized by the grandfather of all treaties, the Iroquois Confederacy . . .  
two-row wampum between your ancestors and those of the Iroquois. The two-row 
wampum committed us to a relationship of peaceful coexistence where the First Nations 
and Europeans would travel in parallel paths down the symbolic river in their own 
vessels. The two-row wampum, which signifies “One River, Two Vessels,” committed 
the newcomers to travel in their vessel and not attempt to interfere with our voyage. The 
two vessels would travel down the river of life in parallel courses and would never 
interfere with each other. It was a co-living agreement. The two-row wampum captures 
the original values that governed our relationship — equality, respect, dignity and a 
sharing of the river we travel on. This is how the First Nations still understand our 
relationship with Canadians.17 
                                               
16.  Robert A. Williams Jr., “The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of 
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence” (1986) Wis. L. 
Rev. 219 at 291:  
When the Haudenosaunee first came into contact with the European nations, treaties 
of peace and friendship were made. Each was symbolized by the Gus-Wen-Tah, or 
Two-Row Wampum. There is a bed of white wampum which symbolizes the purity 
of the agreement. There are two rows of purple, and those two rows have the spirit 
of your ancestors and mine. There are three beads of wampum separating the two 
rows and they symbolize peace, friendship and respect. These two rows will 
symbolize two paths or two vessels, traveling down the same river together. One, a 
birch bark canoe will be for the Indian people, their laws, their customs and their 
ways. The other, a ship, will be for the white people and their laws, their customs, 
and their ways. We shall each travel the river together, side by side, but in our own 
boat. Neither of us will try to steer the other's vessel. 
17.  Ovide Mercredi & Mary Ellen Turpel, In the Rapids: Navigating the Future of First 
Nations (Toronto: Viking/Penguin, 1993) at 35. 
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However, aboriginal documents confirm that although aboriginal peoples 
did wish to preserve a sphere of autonomy, they also appealed to principles 
of mutuality and interconnectedness. As John Borrows underlines, at 
Niagara, in 1764, two wampums were offered to the British: the “[t]wo-row 
wampum” emphasized autonomy, while the “Belt of Peace,” which is less 
well known, symbolized mutuality and interconnectedness.18  
Let me be clearly understood. I am not against the signing of treaties. 
Indeed, such treaties will be absolutely essential to settle territorial claims. 
However, I find fault with “treaty federalism,” because it carries an 
eschatology according to which the signature of treaties is the only 
honourable solution for aboriginals to choose.19 It follows, therefore, that 
                                               
18.  John Borrows, Rediscovering Canada — The Resurgence of Indian Law (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2002) at 150. Borrows writes at 149-50: 
In weighing the Gus Wen Tah’s [“two-row wampum”] potential to encompass 
aboriginal control of Canadian affairs reference must be had to other belts exchanged 
in the same period. The Gus Wen Tah cannot be read in isolation from these other 
instruments, for they clarify the meaning of the two-row wampum. Just as one 
should not interpret a treaty solely according to its written words, the Gus Wen Tah 
should not be read solely on the basis of its woven characters. As will be 
remembered, the Gus Wen Tah was one of two belts exchanged at Niagara in 1764; 
the other belt emphasized the interdependence of the Indians of the Great Lakes and 
the nascent settler population. A ship was woven into one end of the belt, with is 
bow facing towards Quebec; at the other end of the belt is an image of 
Michilimackinac, a place in the centre of the Great Lakes regarded as the heart of the 
Chippewa/Anishinabek homelands. Between these two images were woven twenty-
four Indians holding one another’s hands, with the person furthest to the right 
holding the cable of the ship, while the one on the extreme left has his foot resting on 
the land at Quebec. Representatives of the twenty-two First Nations assembled at 
Niagara in 1764 touched this “Belt of Peace” as a symbol of friendship and as a pledge 
to become ‘united.’ This belt portrays the connection between aboriginal and non-
aboriginal peoples and the lands they occupied. In fact, in this belt the Indians are 
holding on to the ship, pulling it towards them so that they can receive and 
participate in the benefits from the non-Indigenous population. Aboriginal tradition 
can thus support a notion of citizenship that encourages autonomy and at same time 
unifies and connects us to one another, and to the lands we rely on. 
19.  Henderson, supra note 14 at 328-29:  
First Nations' treaties affirm the communal vision of aboriginal peoples. . . . Treaties 
are the device by which aboriginal peoples have codified parts of their histories to 
create a new map of experience. . . . The treaty vision was, and is, at the heart of a 
humane legal order built on unalterable truths of revealed principles of ecological 
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all claims to the effect that natives are at the same time part of an aboriginal 
political community and part of the larger provincial and national 
communities are anathema. In taking this stance, treaty federalism fails to 
recognize that many aboriginals would satisfy themselves with less (for 
example, a broader delegation of power by the federal government). 
More importantly, by focusing entirely on treaties and ignoring the 
potential of our present constitutional structure, treaty federalism fails 
to recognize that many aboriginal communities will never be in 
possession of the political leverage necessary to force non-native 
governments to sit at the negotiation table. The legal dice are currently 
loaded against aboriginal peoples. Unless we acknowledge them as 
“constituent peoples,” that is, as essential actors within the Canadian 
federal state,20 the task of negotiating treaties might prove impossible for 
many aboriginal communities. In other words, treaty federalism might 
very well serve the strong while being but a mirage for the weak. 
The essentialist trap into which the aboriginal rights doctrine 
inevitably leads, combined with treaty federalism’s denial of aboriginal 
and non-aboriginal contemporary interdependence, raises several 
                                               
law. . . . The trust and promises that take the form of a treaty provides coherence and 
purpose in a new environment. They lift aboriginal peoples above the commonplace 
with assurances of partnership in greater things. They give significance to even the 
drudgeries of life because no effort, however menial it may appear, is meaningless 
within the context of a fulfilling sacred vision. With the repudiation of the sacred 
vision embedded in the treaties, there is oppression and stagnation. . . . Among 
aboriginal peoples, the spirit of the treaties is equal to the Mosaic Code of the 
Israelites and equal to St. Paul's vision of Christianity. The vision of the renewing of 
treaties is equal to Mahatma Gandhi's vision of home rule that stirred a sub-
continent, began the long climb of a Third World nation to dignity and initiated the 
decolonization movement in the United Nations. The treaty vision is similar to 
Dr. Martin Luther King's dream of individual equality that stirred the dream of 
African-American minorities. 
20.  Based as it is on a partial fusion of sovereignty between aboriginal nations and the 
successive French, British and Canadian Crowns, federal constitutionalism is premised on 
the idea that aboriginal peoples are prominent actors within our constitutional order. 
This is contrary to the United States, where tribes are said to “have an extraconstitutional 
status because of their pre-existing, original sovereignty; because they were existing 
sovereigns, they were not parties to the U.S. Constitution or state constitutions.” David 
E. Wilkins, American Indian Sovereignty and the U.S. Supreme Court — The Masking of 
Justice (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1997) at 320, n. 10. 
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questions. Is there a legal concept whose roots can be traced back to 
both aboriginal and non-aboriginal normativity, which can embrace the 
historical and contemporary horizons of aboriginal/non-aboriginal 
relationships, and can legally acknowledge the moral interdependency 
that flows from these relationships? Is there a concept that, rather than 
requiring a substantive definition of aboriginal identity or the signing of 
a treaty, would provide each aboriginal community with the political 
autonomy to enable its members to discuss, agree and disagree among 
themselves about what they truly are? I believe such a concept does 
exist, and I choose to call it federal constitutionalism. 
In the remaining part of this article, I will briefly describe what I mean 
by federal constitutionalism. I will then summarize some of the 
advantages of that approach, though I will not have time to explain the 
practical legal consequences to which it could lead. More specifically, I 
will leave until later the difficult question of the substantive legal 
obligations that would flow from embracing the federal 
constitutionalism perspective. 
 
* * * 
 
Building upon studies by Brian Slattery, Jean-François Gaudreault-
DesBiens and Patrick Macklem, among others, I want to demonstrate 
how federalism, understood as a legal and constitutional principle, 
might provide a more fruitful means of addressing the “aboriginal 
question” than the paths presently followed by the Supreme Court. In 
addition, the federal solution advocated here might also avoid the one-
sidedness of the “treaty federalism” approach. I call this approach 
“federal constitutionalism” to underline that the federal principle to 
which I refer is nestled in Canada’s federal constitution, and is able to be 
sanctioned by a court of law.  
Federal constitutionalism is a theory that is both abstract and 
“situated.” First, it is premised on the idea that some core legal 
principles must constantly be met if a system wishes to be called federal. 
Gaudreault-DesBiens states that: 
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a federal alliance necessarily implies a minimum level, first, of trust [or loyalty] between 
the parties [ . . . ] second, of equality between them; third, of autonomy, and fourth, of 
[ . . . ] efficiency in the functioning of the alliance, elements that point, on the one hand, 
to the concept of subsidiarity and, on the other hand, to the concept of federal arbitration. 
[ . . . ] [Another] principl[e], which [ . . . ] ranks alongside those of loyalty, equality, 
autonomy, and federal arbitration, is the principle of federal solidarity, which can 
undoubtedly be viewed as stemming from the very nature of a federal alliance.21  
 
Gaudreault-DesBiens’ approach, however, is too abstract to be of any 
use on its own. As a distributive enterprise, constitutional law in 
general — and federal constitutionalism in particular — requires an 
analysis of both the historical and contemporary contexts of the society 
within which these abstract principles operate. As such, federal 
constitutionalism also denies that the scope of the federal principle is 
exhausted by sections 91 to 95 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Rather than 
being built upon a formal conception of our constitution, federal 
constitutionalism is based on an “organic” understanding — organic in 
the sense of a living constitutional experience. In the words of Brian 
Slattery, our constitution 
 
is the product of slow and continuing growth, as molded in part by local Canadian 
influences and tradition [ . . . and] is grounded in ancient practices generated by 
interaction between aboriginal nations and British and French officials in eastern North 
America during the seventeenth and eighteenth century.22 
 
The federal constitutionalism perspective opens the door to the recognition 
of aboriginal peoples as federal actors or constituent peoples. An organic 
understanding of our constitution leads to the conclusion that aboriginal 
nations were active participants in the creation of the Canadian federal state, 
whatever the written constitution might say. The members of the alliance 
that would eventually form the Canadian federation were not always 
officially and symbolically recognized in our constitutional documents. Some 
                                               
21.  Jean-François Gaudreault-DesBiens, “The Canadian Federal Experiment, or Legalism 
without Federalism? Toward a Legal Theory of Federalism” in Manuel Calvo-Garcia & 
William L.F. Felstiner, Federalismo/Federalism (Madrid: Dyckinson, 2004) 81 at 112, 122. 
22.  Brian Slattery, “The Organic Constitution: Aboriginal Peoples and the Evolution of 
Canada” (1996) 34 Osgoode Hall L.J. 101 at 108-09. 
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were initially recognized, then temporarily excluded, and reinstated at a later 
time. For example, although the aboriginal peoples as federal actors were 
ignored by the Constitution Act, 1867, their importance was heralded in the 
Royal Proclamation of 176323 and in the many treaties they signed with the 
French, British and Canadian Crowns. Thus, in connecting the principle of 
autonomy with that of solidarity, treaties played a significant role in the 
development of the federal idea in Canada. More recently, section 35 of the 
Constitution Act, 1982 recognized the aboriginal peoples’ ongoing 
contribution to the building of the Canadian state.24  
The treatment of the people of New France residing in what became 
the Province of Quebec in 1763 provides another example. The 
common law rules regulating the introduction of English law in a 
conquered colony confirmed the right of these “new subjects” to the use 
of their own law in private matters. The voice of the “nation 
canadienne”25 was later silenced by the Royal Proclamation of 1763, but it 
found resonance once again under the Constitution Act, 1791. After 
                                               
23. Royal Proclamation, 1763 (U.K.), R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1. 
24.  One should also recall that representatives of the national aboriginal organizations 
participated, along with the federal and provincial governments, in the negotiations 
leading to the 1992 Charlottetown Accord. 
25.  Although predominantly francophone and Catholic, this “nation canadienne” 
qualified as what we would today call a “multicultural society”: 
“Multicultural” is a modern term that best captures a fundamental feature of early 
Canada’s make-up. That there was a French Catholic ascendancy is undeniable; in the 
official Bourden vision of colonial development, only a single cultural identity was 
fully recognized.  Protestants were to be present only temporarily, as prisoners 
awaiting repatriation or as businessmen in transit. Natives, from this same 
perspective, were in a state of suspension, thier humanity not fully realized since they 
had not yet been subsumed, absorbed, and digested into the Christian culture of 
Europe. As for the black and Native slaves of New France, they were theoretically 
pieces of property rather than members of a civil society. It is important to recognize 
this dominant view of the period, but we are not required to perpetuate it in our 
retrospective study of French-regime society. Although those who set the tone, gave 
the orders, and wrote the documents in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
refused to recognize the distinctive identities of cultural minorities, the latter did 
exist.  A real and enduring presence in New France, non-Catholic, non-white 
elements formed an indispensible and influential part of colonial society. 
Allan Greer, The People of New France (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997) at 
114. The multicultural fabric of Quebec society is therefore not a recent phenomenon. 
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another failed attempt at silencing it by the Union Act, 1840, it was 
officially recognized in the Constitution Act, 1867. In the words of 
Roderick A. Macdonald, ours is a “reconstitutive federalism.”26 Professor 
Slattery puts it this way: “Canada is an independent, multinational 
federation, with an autonomous Constitution rooted in several centuries 
of shared and divergent national experiences”; it is the product of “a 
merging of the sovereignties of its various component nations, with the 
aboriginal peoples retaining a measure of their original autonomy.”27 In 
short, to claim that the text of the Constitution Act, 1867 does not 
recognize aboriginal peoples as federal actors is not to say that our 
constitutional order, seen in its entirety, recognizes no such status. Indeed, 
aboriginal peoples were, and continue to be, active participants in the 
federal framework of our country.  
The organic approach upon which federal constitutionalism is based has 
important consequences. By recognizing aboriginal peoples as federal actors, 
it symbolically destroys the image of aboriginal peoples as passive victims of 
a history in which they had no part, and also destroys the image of Canada 
as terra nullius. As well, the organic approach requires that we recognize the 
factual and moral interdependence that slowly grew out of the relationships 
between aboriginals and non-aboriginals.28 In John Whyte’s elegant prose, 
“we are born into past commitments and inherit them.”29 If federal 
constitutionalism leads to the conclusion that aboriginal peoples are 
constituent actors in the Canadian constitutional order, it also forces us to 
admit that Canada is a multinational federation. That is, federalism in 
Canada is not just a means of dividing powers territorially, but it is also an 
instrument designed to take into account the wishes of national minorities 
to control their collective destinies.30 Federal constitutionalism demands that 
aboriginal (and Québecois) nationalism be taken seriously.  
                                               
26.  Roderick A. Macdonald, “Kaleidoscopic Federalism” in Jean-Francois Gaudreault-
DesBiens & Fabien Gélinas, eds., States and Moods of Federalism: Governance, Identity and 
Methodology (Montreal: Éditions Yvon Blais, 2005) at 264. 
27.  Slattery, supra note 22 at 107 and 109. 
28.  Brian Slattery, “First Nations and the Constitution: A Question of Trust” (1992) 71 
Can. Bar Rev. 261 at 276. 
29.  John D. Whyte, “Nations, Minorities and Authority” (1991) 40 U.N.B.L.J. 45 at 49. 
30.  Will Kymlicka, La voie canadienne: Repenser le multiculturalisme, trans. by Antoine 
Robitaille (Montreal: Éditions du Boréal, 2003) at 222. 
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* * * 
 
There are some advantages that would result from adopting the federal 
constitutionalism approach. First, it brings out the fact that what is at 
issue is not a mere aboriginal right opposed to the federal or provincial 
state, but a power conflict, “power” being understood as the capacity of a 
state to impose its will on citizens, and consequently to constrain 
dissidents. Aboriginal peoples indeed do not claim a form of freedom in 
opposition to state intervention, as would an individual. What they do 
claim is a competing, if not an exclusive, political authority over persons 
whom the Canadian state also wants to subject to its own authority. And 
it being symbolically important to call a spade a spade, the federal 
principle, whose vocation it is to manage this type of conflict of authority, 
to me seems a more appropriate ground than section 35 on which to 
found the aboriginal/non-aboriginal relationship. 
Second, federal constitutionalism dissociates the issue of the 
sovereignty of aboriginals over their internal affairs from aboriginal 
rights having to do with territorial or economic issues. Negotiations are 
absolutely necessary to settle the latter, since aboriginals and non-
aboriginals both have claims to the territory and its resources, but an 
aboriginal community’s sovereignty over its internal affairs requires no 
such negotiations. Under the federal constitutionalism approach, all 
aboriginal communities are endowed with sovereignty over their 
internal affairs. As for their distinct and diverse claims to some control 
over the territory, these claims would continue to be dealt with under 
section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
Third, by constitutionally guaranteeing aboriginal communities a sphere 
of political autonomy over their internal matters — matters which, by 
nature, are culturally sensitive — federal constitutionalism enables them to 
deliniate their cultural path without constantly having to gaze into a 
sixteenth century mirror. In other words, it allows aboriginal 
communities to escape the “cultural distinctiveness” trap. These 
communities will decide for themselves, in the exercise of their political 
autonomy, what they want to be, whatever that might be. Under the 
federal constitutionalism approach, aboriginal collective self-definition is 
to be carried out in the political rather than the judicial arena.  
534 (2006) 31 Queen’s L.J. 
 
Fourth, federal constitutionalism would remove from the grasp of the 
Sparrow31 limitation test all matters relating to an aboriginal 
community’s internal affairs. Since territorial issues concern matters 
over which both aboriginal and non-aboriginal communities lay claim, a 
test aimed at balancing their respective interests is not out of place. 
However, matters internal to an aboriginal community should in no 
way be subjected to the interests of the non-aboriginal community 
(unless the aboriginal community consents to it). 
Fifth, constitutional federalism is based on the idea that our individual 
identities are complex and that they comprise more than a single 
allegiance. This is true of the aboriginal peoples of Canada as well as 
non-aboriginal Canadians. Furthermore, constitutional federalism, and 
more precisely the federal solidarity principle, requires that citizens 
acknowledge this web of interlocking allegiances and act accordingly. 
For the federal alliance to survive, it is essential that individual members 
of aboriginal communities participate directly in the political and 
governmental institutions of the provinces and of Canada.  
Sixth, as I said earlier, federal constitutionalism encourages aboriginal 
participation in the provincial and federal governments. This 
participation is essential, since laws adopted by Parliament or by a 
legislature might affect yet unproven aboriginal or treaty rights. 
Furthermore, in the words of John Borrows, 
 
aboriginal peoples would resist assimilation through such recognition because their values 
where the land is concerned could be entrenched in Canada’s governing ideas and 
institutions. They could help to reconfigure Canada in an important way.32  
 
Finally, this approach underlines the collective character of the 
integration of the aboriginal peoples into Canada’s constitutional order, 
as opposed to the individual nature of an immigrant’s integration. 
 
* * * 
                                               
31.  R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075. The test has been modified in cases such as R. v. 
Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723; Delgamuukw, supra note 4; and R. v. Marshall [No. 2], 
[1999] 3 S.C.R. 533. 
32.  Borrows, supra note 18 at 146. 
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In conclusion, I am not claiming that federal constitutionalism is the 
“best” solution, though I am claiming that it is better than others. It is 
more just than the Supreme Court’s “cultural distinctiveness” approach. 
It provides a more coherent legal framework, because it is based on the 
recognition of aboriginal peoples as constituent peoples of the Canadian 
federal state. As political entities, and not simply “cultural 
communities,” aboriginal peoples are entitled to a constitutionally 
guaranteed sphere of political autonomy within Canada’s constitutional 
order. As well, because federal constitutionalism gives equal weight to 
both the historical and contemporary aspects of aboriginal and non-
aboriginal relationships, it is a more appropriate solution than treaty 
federalism, which emphasizes the isolation and separateness of the two 
communities. Unlike the treaty federalism approach, federal 
constitutionalism does not deny the normative consequences stemming 
from the interdependency that has slowly grown out of the 
relationships between aboriginals and non-aboriginals. 
